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ABSTRACT 
 
This master thesis examines the jet fuel hedging behavior in the European airline industry 
using publicly available information. US companies are also included for comparisons 
between the markets. The thesis concludes that jet fuel hedging airlines have higher market-
to-book ratios measured by Tobin’s Q. The authors believe that putting an absolute number on 
the hedging premium, must be done with caution. The hypothesis that hedging adds more 
value in periods of greater uncertainty and higher volatility is inconclusive and rejected. Of 
the variables included in regressions, the papers suggest that the most important determinants 
of jet fuel hedging levels are company size, dividends, debt ratio and investment levels.  
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PREFACE 
 
We decided to write our master thesis about the airline industry because of several reasons. 
We have always been fascinated by this industry. During our bachelor’s degree at NHH, we 
have worked with a case of Norwegian Air Shuttle and Scandinavian Airline Systems (SAS). 
We were particularly interested in this case because of the challenges both companies face 
and the nature of competition in the market. Being exposed to this case as well as extensive 
travel experience made this industry a natural industry to investigate.  
We are both taking financial economics as a major in our master’s degree and have touched 
upon issues such as risk management and even the famous Southwest Airlines case, where the 
issue is jet fuel hedging. Examining the airline jet fuel hedging in practice was therefore a 
natural topic for this thesis. 
After choosing hedging in the airline industry as an overall topic, we started searching for 
existing literature on the internet, in the school library and its databases. We found that there 
exist extensive literature describing why non-financial firms hedge. We could not find, 
however, much written about whether hedging activities leads to increased value, especially 
not in the airline industry. We found one article written about the US airline industry, but not 
for the European. These markets are similar in some areas, but they are also different in a lot 
of others. The last couple of years, the global economy has suffered from record all-time-high 
commodity prices, volatility as well as a financial crisis. All these things made jet fuel 
hedging in the European airline industry an interesting subject. 
The work has not been free from trouble. The availability of hedging data from airlines is 
limited. Most companies report in their annual reports the levels of hedging and instruments 
used, due to accounting standard requirements. However, we found it difficult to do reliable 
tests on the data available. Thus, the many possible subjects we wanted to explore were 
eliminated immediately. Another consequence of the low availability of suitable data is that 
the reliability of our tests and conclusions decreases. 
The data collection has proved very time-consuming and frustrating. Since a lot of data is 
obtained from company reports, we had to find reports from all companies in all years and 
read through the reports searching for the relevant information. We found that many 
companies differ in the way they report and in the availability of reports. We have therefore 
contacted some of the companies ourselves to get reports from missing periods.  
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We have used publicly available information from company reports and websites as well as 
the Compustat database. 
After writing this thesis, we feel that we have learned much about the airline industry in 
general and about jet fuel economics in particular.  
We wish to thank our advisor Kyoung Sun Park for useful comments during our work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bergen, June 17th 2009 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------                                                           --------------------------------------- 
         Christian Kvello                                                                                Henrik Nesset Stenvik 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is aimed at examining the jet fuel behavior in the European airline industry. We 
are specifically interested in whether jet fuel hedging is adding value to a firm seen from an 
investor’s perspective. If we find that hedging adds value, we try to answer two additional 
questions. The first is whether hedging adds more value in period when volatility and 
uncertainty is higher than normal. This is a very interesting question, since over the last two 
years, the global economy has suffered from high and volatile commodity prices followed by 
one of the most severe financial crisis in history. The second question is how hedging might 
add value. We also try to find out why airlines hedge, i.e. what are the determinants of 
hedging levels in the industry.  
We compare our results to the American market by including American companies as well as 
relate our findings to existing literature in risk management in general, and in the airline 
industry in particular.  
We investigate the industry by collecting publicly available information and perform 
regression analyses on these.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview over the European market. 
Chapter 3 describes the economic effects jet fuel costs have on airlines. In chapter 4, we 
provide an extensive overview of existing literature with regards to why non-financial firms 
hedge. Chapter 5 describes the hedging behavior in the airline industry. Regression analyses 
and results are described in chapter 6 while chapter 7 concludes the paper. At the very end, we 
have put tables and graph in an appendix.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE MARKET 
Over the last decades, the European airline industry has gone through several changes and 
looks very different now than 20 years ago. Technological development and economic growth 
have resulted in affordable airline tickets and an increasing number of passengers transported 
each year.   
2.1. From private to public 
The typical airline was founded and owned by the government in each country.  These “flag 
carriers” were given names such as British Airways, Air France, and Scandinavian Airlines 
Systems (SAS) to name a few.  The companies were symbols of national pride and 
protectionism.  As financial markets have developed and many countries have deregulated the 
airline market, the companies were privatized or partly privatized. Governments have given 
private investors the task of managing the airlines, hoping that they do it more effectively.  
Almost all the largest airlines are now listed on stock exchanges around Europe.  The 
privatization has also led to mergers and acquisitions in the industry. Examples of this are the 
merger between Air France and KLM (2004), the acquisition of Swissair by Lufthansa (2002) 
and SAS’ acquisition of Spanair (period up to 2007).  
2.2. Open skies & deregulations 
Changes in the last 25 years have been significant in airline regulation. Open Skies1 refers to a 
multilateral aviation agreement which liberalizes rules for international air transportation and 
minimizes government intervention. After World War II, many countries invested national 
pride in the creation and defense of airlines. Air transportation differs from many other 
businesses, because airlines were wholly or partly owned by governments. Crossing boarders 
(with or without landing) could be seen as trespassing when special permissions were 
missing. Open Skies smoothened civil passenger transportation. The US began pursuing Open 
Skies in the late 70s and in 1982 it had signed twenty-three bilateral air service agreements 
worldwide, mainly with smaller nations. Several more agreements were made in the 90s 
between US, European and other international countries.  
2.3. The rise of low cost carriers 
The last decade has been characterized by the rise of low cost carriers (LCCs). LCC or “no 
frills” airlines offer low fares and eliminates unnecessary services, such as complementary 
drinks and business-class seating.  These airlines often fly from more remote airports with one 
                                                           
1
 http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra/ata/index.htm  
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type of aircraft to cut overheads (lower access charges and maintenance costs).  The aircraft 
cabin may be less comfortable; dispensing video screens, reclining seats and some airlines 
also have advertisement inside the cabin to increase revenue.  Some also charge their 
passengers to carry luggage and reserve seats. They may also fly on odd times.  LCCs have 
made travelling by air cheaper on many routes and forced the traditional airlines to focus on 
cost-cutting. The LCC is typically not member of an airline alliance, and flies point-to-point.  
2.4. Terrorist threats and security issues 
The terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York, USA September 11th 2001 was a 
dreadful example that airlines can be subject to terrorist operations and reminded people that 
flying is not entirely safe. Not only did the attacks scare people from flying in the subsequent 
years, but airports and airlines now faced a new reality with regards to security issues.  After 
the incident, they had to pay a lot closer attention to airport and airplane security, imposing 
additional costs. Passengers now have to bring identification, go through several security 
check points and are not allowed to bring along the items they were used to.  
2.5. Alliances and codeshare agreements 
Some airlines (especially the traditional and biggest carriers) cooperate in their operations via 
alliances and codeshare agreements. An alliance is an agreement between airlines to provide a 
network of connectivity and convenience for international passengers and packages. Star 
Alliance, SkyTeam and Oneworld are the three largest alliances worldwide. The benefits of 
being an alliance member include cost reductions from sales, maintenance, operational 
facilities and staff as well as investments and purchases. Passengers benefit through lower 
prices, more frequent departures, more destinations, shorter travel times and faster mileage 
rewards. Code sharing or codeshare is a less organized way of cooperating. The term refers to 
a practice where a flight operated by one airline is jointly marketed as a flight for other 
airlines that have a code share agreement with the operating airline.  Most major airlines have 
such agreements with other airlines and code sharing is a key feature of alliances.  
2.6. Frequent flyer programs 
To maintain customer loyalty, most airlines have frequent flyer programs. As you fly, you 
earn “miles” or points corresponding to the distance flown and/or money spent on tickets. 
These miles can be redeemed for free travel or other goods such as hotel nights, rental cars or 
other benefits. Such programs decrease competition and allow airlines to keep prices higher 
than they would have been without the programs present.  This is the reason why such 
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programs are not allowed in Norway. SAS used to have one (they still have on international 
flights), but were forced to terminate it by the government in 20022.  
2.7. Climate change 
Airplane engines use kerosene as fuel. The jet engines emit  which is a greenhouse gas. 
Greenhouse gases are harmful to the environment and leads to global warming3. The focus on 
global warming has increased, especially after Al Gore won the Nobel peace price in 2007. 
The effect on airlines is that some are now being charged fees for polluting or the fear of soon 
being so. 
2.8. Sample firms presentation 
2.8.1. Sample firms 
In this thesis we want to examine the European airline market. We have chosen 14 of the 20 
largest airlines in Europe. For analyzing purposes, we need qualitative and quantitative data, 
and have therefore examined public firms, since they are legally committed to issuing 
periodically reports and figures.  Below is an alphabetical list of the sample, together with 
main characteristics: 
ASK 2008 Sample ASK Frequent
Classification Founded Alliance Destinations (mill.) market share flyer program Headquarter
Aer Lingus LCC 1936 None 69 22,400 2.2 % Gold Circle Club Dublin, Ireland
Air Berlin LCC 1978 None 79 56,480 5.6 % Topbonus Berlin, Germany
Air-France KLM Traditional 2004* SkyTeam 258 256,314 25.6 % Flying Blue Paris, France
Austrian Traditional 1957 Star Alliance 117 25,100 2.5 % Miles & More Vienna, Austria
British Airways Traditional 1924 Oneworld 169 149,545 14.9 % Executive Club, Premier London, England
easyJet LCC 1995 None 106 55,687 5.6 % None Luton, England
El Al Airways Traditional 1948 None 45 20,074 2.0 % Matmid Club Lod, Israel
Finnair Traditional 1923 Oneworld 126 29,101 2.9 % Finnair Plus Vantaa, Finland
Iberia Traditional 1927 Oneworld 115 66,517 6.6 % Iberia Plus Madrid, Spain
Lufthansa Traditional 1926 Star Alliance 209 195,431 19.5 % Miles & More Cologne, Germany
Norwegian Air Shuttle LCC 1993 None 84 11,574 1.2 % None Oslo, Norway
Ryanair LCC 1985 None 143 66,519 6.6 % None Dublin, Ireland
SAS Traditional 1946 Atar Alliance 150 45,764 4.6 % Eurobonus Stockholm, Sweden
Swiss International Air Lines Traditional 2002** Star Alliance 76 N/A N/A Kloten, Switzerland
*2004 merger between Air France (founded 1933) and KLM (founded 1919)
**Founded after the bankruptcy of Swissair (founded 1931). Subsidiary of Lufthansa Source: Company websites and annual reports
Sample firms characteristics (European airlines)
 
                                                           
2
 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/Vedtak-og-uttalelser/Vedtak-og-avgjorelser/inngrep-mot-SAS-
Wideroes-og-Braathens-bonusprogrammer/ 
 
3
 At least this is the consensus of the majority of leading researchers 
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Total ASK
2006 - 2008 (mill.)
Air-France KLM 736,049
Lufthansa 511,259
British Airways 442,060
Iberia 198,767
Ryanair 157,106
SAS 153,752
Air Berlin 147,260
Easyjet 136,276
Austrian 83,074
Finnair 79,825
El Al Airways 59,930
Aer Lingus 59,259
Norwegian 24,505
Swiss N/A
ASK by airline
 
Among the companies are five LCCs and nine traditional airlines. Ranked by available seat 
kilometers 4(ASK), Air France-KLM is the biggest followed by Lufthansa and British 
Airways5.  LCCs are typically not member of airline alliances, but practices codesharing to 
some extent.   
Data collection seems a lot easier for American companies. Existing risk management 
literature has also only focused on the US market. We have therefore also included some 
American companies so that we can do a comparison between the markets6. These companies 
are among the biggest airlines in the US. We have four LCCs and eleven traditional airlines. 
The American market is more homogenous than the European market. The companies are 
more similar with regards to tax schemes, geographical diversification and other 
macroeconomic factors.   
2.8.2.  Data collection & time horizon 
This thesis examines the jet fuel hedging behavior of European and US airlines. We want to 
investigate the relationship between firm value and hedging behavior, but also the 
determinants of jet fuel hedging. The data used and analyzed is publicly available 
information.  General accounting and financial information is collected from the Compustat 
database7.  All other data is collected from each company’s annual reports and Investor Day 
                                                           
4
 One seat kilometer represent one seat flown one kilometer.  
5
 See table 1 in the appendix for a full list of ASK by airline and year. 
6
 See table 2 in the appendix for a list of US companies in the sample. 
7
 http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/comp/gfunda/ A subscription is necessary to access the data base. The 
subscription is not free.  
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presentations for European airlines. For US airlines, most information is found in 10-k filings 
or Proxy statements8.  Such documents are found on the website of each company.  
We have collected and analyzed data for the years 2001-2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8
 10-k is the name of the annual financial report required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by 
all publicly held corporations. A proxy statement is also required by the SEC and is sent to the shareholders of a 
public company. It contains proposals to be voted upon by shareholders. It also contains useful information 
about compensation of corporate officers and ownership of stock and stock options by company officers and 
directors. See reference list for website URLs.  
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CHAPTER 3:  JET FUEL AND AIRLINE ECONOMICS 
3.1. Oil and jet fuel prices 
Jet fuel costs constitute a large portion of an airline’s operating expenses. During the last 
decade, competition has become more intense; ticket fares have decreased and thus put 
pressure on airlines’ profit margins. The years 2007, 2008 and 2009 were especially 
challenging, with all-time high commodity prices together with the following global financial 
crash. 
Jet fuel is refined from crude oil; most products of oil processing are usually grouped into 
three categories which are light distillates (LPG and gasoline), middle distillates (heating oil, 
kerosene and diesel fuel), heavy distillates and residuum (fuel oil, lubricating oils, wax and 
tar). The products in each category share similar characteristics. Jet fuel consists of kerosene 
with some additives; hence it shares the same characteristics as heating oil and diesel fuel.  
Jet fuel is only traded over the counter since the market for jet fuel is not liquid enough to 
warrant a futures contract or any other exchange traded contracts.  
As seen from the graph below, oil and jet fuel prices are highly correlated: 
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The correlations9 between returns of Amsterdam – Rotterdam – Antwerp Jet fuel Spot and 
Europe Brent oil Spot is 0.74.  Correlations between oil and different oil refined products are 
ranging from 0.6717 and 0.928510.  
                                                           
9
 Calculated using weekly data collected from EIA (1986 – 2009) 
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In July 2008 the oil price peaked at $ 140/barrel, and at this time many analysts predicted the 
oil price to rise even further11. Not since the 1979 energy crisis has the price of oil reached 
such a level adjusted for inflation. The impact of the financial crisis (late 2008) resulted in 
decreasing oil prices and this shows the oil price is highly unpredictable. The price of oil is 
very volatile since it behaves like any other commodity; the price is dependent on supply and 
demand. Global macroeconomic conditions controls the demand for oil, the boosting oil price 
in 2007 was largely created by an increasing demand from emerging economies such as India 
and China12. In recent times they have been affected by the global credit crunch, reducing 
their exports, resulting in a lower demand for oil. 
3.2. Fuel costs’ portion of operating expenses 
For our European sample, jet fuel costs as a percentage of operating expenses has increased 
from about 13% on average in 2001 to over 28% in 2008.  The trend is illustrated in the figure 
below: 
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It is easy to spot differences between our sample firms. For the years 2006-2008, the 
percentage ranged from 17.8 (SAS) to 37.5 (El Al). Jet fuel costs constitute a larger portion of 
operating expenses for LCC’s than traditional airlines, and this is seen from the following 
table (ranged from highest to lowest) for the years 2006-2008: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10
 Calculated using weekly data collected from EIA (1986 – 2009). See table 5 in the appendix for a full table of 
correlations. 
11
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/goldman-predicts-crude-prices-will-superspike-to-200-
per-barrel-822235.html. Goldman Sachs analysts predicts oil price in May 2008.  
12
 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3014033.cms  
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Average
Classification 2006-2008
El Al Airways Trad 37.5 %
Ryanair LCC 36.7 %
Norwegian LCC 32.3 %
Easyjet LCC 28.8 %
Air Berlin LCC 25.9 %
Iberia Trad 24.9 %
British Airways Trad 23.8 %
Aer Lingus LCC 23.2 %
Finnair Trad 21.4 %
Austrian Trad 19.1 %
Air-France KLM Trad 19.0 %
Lufthansa Trad 18.1 %
SAS Trad 17.8 %
Swiss Trad N/A
Jet fuel costs as % of 
operating expenses
 
The trend is similar for all airlines in the sample13. 
According to Air Transportation Association, fuel surpassed labor as the largest portion of 
operating expenses for U.S. airlines. There may be differences between the U.S. and the 
European market but it this chart may serve as an indicator of European airlines’ cost 
structure: 
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13
 See table 3 and graph 1 in the appendix for  a comprehensive summary and illustration of jet fuel costs in the 
period 2001-2008 
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3.3. Jet fuel price risk exposure 
3.3.1. Jet fuel price volatility 
Not only did the jet fuel price reach record heights in 2008, but its volatility was also high. As 
seen from the graphs below, the volatility measured in standard deviation of price changes 
peaked at 5.1% and 14.1% for weekly and monthly changes respectively14.  
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High and volatile fuel prices, together with the following global financial crisis, made 2008 a 
difficult year for airline companies in terms of financial management and planning.   
3.3.2. Jet fuel price sensitivity and economic effects.  
It is interesting to examine the economic impact on airlines from jet fuel price changes.  As 
previously discussed, fuel prices are volatile. Since fuel costs constitute a large share of 
operating expenses, this volatility will in turn affect the bottom line and cash flows of an 
airline. According to the Air Transportation Association15 the US airline industry will face 
$18.8 billion more in operating expenses if the price were a dollar higher for a gallon of fuel 
over the course of 2008.  We have no such data for European airlines, but the US numbers 
indicate that the impact of rising prices is huge for the entire industry.  
One approach to measure the economic impact from jet fuel price fluctuation is to regress 
year-over-year changes in quarterly operating income before depreciation on the changes in 
quarterly fuel price.  We use year-over-year data because of seasonality in income.  We scale 
operating cash flow by sales. For the years 2005 to 2008, the regressions yield the following 
results: 
                                                           
14
 Calculated using daily data collected from EIA (1986 – 2009) 
15
 http://www.airlines.org/economics/energy/fuel+QA.htm  
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Regression summary: YOY jet fuel price
effect on quarterly operating cash flow
Year Coefficient P-value #obs
2005-2008 -0.0439 0.007 159
2008 -0.0189 0.743 31
2007 0.0097 0.832 50
2006 -0.0561 0.436 45
2005 0.0059 0.932 31
 
For the entire period, the coefficient was -0.0439 and significant at a 95% confidence level 
indicating that rising jet fuel prices are negatively related to operating cash flow16.  
Another way of investigating the fuel price impact on airlines is estimating a market model 
that includes a weekly jet fuel return factor. Based on weekly returns from stock, market 
index and jet fuel price we construct the following model: 
 
were  is the stock return on company i in week t,  is the return on the index where the 
company is listed in week t,  is the percentage change in jet fuel prices in week t and  is 
the idiosyncratic error.  and  are the coefficients, representing the stock return’s 
sensitivity to market and jet fuel price changes.  For each company we use the index on the 
exchange were the stocks are traded, i.e. FTSE500 for companies listed on London Stock 
Exchange, OSEBX for Norwegian Air Shuttle etc17. Other things being equal, airlines (and 
airline stock owners) would prefer low fuel prices. We would therefore expect the coefficient 
to be negative.   
The table below shows the regression coefficient for airlines’ stock returns versus jet fuel 
price changes and market returns respectively. For American airlines we have used New York 
Harbour jet fuel prices and for European airlines we have used Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Antwerp jet fuel prices. Our sample consists of 18 airlines (6 biggest American and 12 
European). The result shows a negative exposure for the median for all periods except 2001 
and 2009. 2001 was a year with few company observations and 2009 is a year with few total 
observations at the time this thesis was written. The mean exposure differs in 2004 and 2005 
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 See graph 2 and 3 in the appendix for illustrations 
17
 Data is collected from http://finance.yahoo.com/  
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where the coefficient is positive for European airlines. The stock returns for the whole period 
of 2001 – 2009 are negatively related to jet fuel price changes for all airlines. 
2001-2009
Coefficient
Average jet fuel coef  all airlines -0.1532
Average jet fuel coef US airlines -0.2156
Average jet fuel coef European airlines -0.1220
Median jet fuel coef all a irlines -0.1324
Median jet fuel coef US airlines -0.1335
Median jet fuel coef European airlines -0.1270
Average Index coef All 1.2536
Average Index coef US 1.9208
Average Index coef EUR 0.9200
Median Index coef All 1.1197
Median Index coef US 2.1534
Median Index coef EUR 0.9843
Regression; Stock price vs Jet fuel price and market
 
 
The P-values are rarely significant within a 95% confidence level, so the results are 
inconclusive18.  All companies show a negative relation between stock return and jet fuel 
price changes. In 2008, however, there is a big difference between the coefficient for 
European and American firms. American firms seems much more negatively related to jet 
fuel price changes in the first half of the year, while they seem much more positively related 
to jet fuel price changes in the second half.  This is hard for us to explain without further 
investigation. What we do know is that oil and fuel prices were rising in the first half, and 
started falling significantly in the second half. At the same time, the credit crunch and 
financial crisis hit the market with full effect.  
3.4. Hedging price risk 
We have seen that jet fuel prices have been high and volatile, representing a huge portion of 
an airline’s operating expenses. Our regressions show that rising fuel prices negatively affect 
financial performance and stock returns.  In addition to increasing competition and profit 
margin pressure, this may be a reason why a financial manager wants to hedge this price risk. 
In the following chapter we turn to hedging theory and try to find reasons why companies 
hedge risk.    
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 See table 4 in the appendix for a regression summary 
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CHAPTER 4:  RATIONALES FOR NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS TO 
HEDGE 
4.1.      Introduction and historical overview 
Financial or corporate risk, the risk deriving from earnings fluctuations, influences the value 
of a company. Allen and Santomerano (1995)19 argue that the importance of financial risk 
management has increased in the decades after 1960. This is due to a combination of 
deregulations, international competition, interest rates and foreign exchange rate volatility, 
together with commodity price discontinuities. Before derivative markets were highly 
developed, companies that wanted to hedge their risks had few opportunities, but operational 
hedging strategies e.g. establishing plants abroad to minimize exchange rate risks or trying to 
match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities (Santomero 1995) 20.  
 
During the last three decades, the derivative markets have developed incredibly. The range of 
financial instruments available and the use thereof has skyrocketed. A great number of non-
financial firms are now using these instruments, traded both on exchanges and Over-The-
Counter (OTC).  Together with this development, risk management has become an important 
objective of companies’ strategies (Bartram 200021) 
 
In recent decades there has been several studies trying to explain why firms manage risk, or 
hedge. The literature focuses on non-financial firms because financial firms are considered as 
users and providers of hedging instruments and could therefore have different factors 
affecting their hedging strategies.  Several researchers have tried to explain why risk 
management activities create value, and the explanations rely on some frictions to the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM)22 theory that say hedging does not add value to a firm.  
Even though the predicted power of the theories has been indicated in many papers, there is 
not yet a unique, well accepted framework that practitioners can rely on when setting their 
hedging strategies. Another problem is data collection. Empirical testing has often proved 
difficult, due to lack of available/quality corporate hedging data.  
                                                           
19
  Allen, F and Santomero A.M (1995): What do Financial Intermediaries Do?, Business Week, June 12 1995, p. 
70 
20
 Santomero, A.M. (1995), Financial Risk Management: The Whys and Hows, Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Instruments 4 (5), pp. 1-14 
21
 Bartram, S.M (2000), Corporate risk management as a lever for shareholder value creation, Financial-
markets, institutions and instruments 9 (5), pp. 279-324 
22
 Miller, M.  and Modigliani, F. (1958). "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment". American Economic Review 48 (3): 261–297 
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Since theory and practice obviously departs, and this is explained by market imperfections, 
scholars have constructed two classes of explanations for hedging of non-systematic risk. The 
first class focuses on hedging activities and their relation to shareholder maximization while 
the second class focuses on the relation to managers’ private utility.  We will now present 
motives non-financial firms may have to hedge risk.  
4.2.     Does hedging really matter? 
It was for a long time believed that hedging activities were irrelevant for the value of the firm. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 196423, Lintner 196524, Mossin 196625) 
implies that diversified investors should only care about the systematic component of the total 
risk. As a result, it appears that managers that want to maximize shareholder value should be 
indifferent about hedging unsystematic risk. The findings from CAPM are also supported by 
Miller and Modigliani’s proposition. This proposition says that hedging decisions are 
completely irrelevant, because shareholders already can protect themselves against such risks 
by holding well diversified portfolios. However, the MM world is based upon several more or 
less unrealistic assumptions, such as (i) neutral taxes; (ii) no capital market frictions ( i.e., no 
transaction costs, asset trade restrictions or bankruptcy costs); (iii) symmetric access to credit 
markets (i.e., firms and investors can borrow or lend at the same interest rates); and (iv) firm 
financial policy reveals no information). Under these conditions it is hard to reject the 
hypothesis, but in real life the conditions does not hold.  
4.3.  Shareholder maximization hypothesis 
4.3.1.  Financial distress costs  
Financial distress costs are related to the probability of an actual bankruptcy or the probability 
thereof. Bankruptcy costs can be divided into two categories; direct and indirect costs. Direct 
costs are related to the costs incurred in the bankruptcy proceeding, e.g. legal and 
administrative costs (fees to lawyers, expert witnesses, accounting fees), and the sale of assets 
to below fair market value prices. These can be large if the assets are specialized or non-
                                                           
23
 Sharpe, W.F (1964): Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, Journal of 
Finance 19 (3), pp 425 - 265 
24
 Lintner, J. (1965): Security prices, risk and maximal gains from diversification, Journal of Finance 20 (4), pp 
587-615 
25
 Mossin, J (1966): Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, Econometrica 34 (4), pp. 768-783 
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tangible (Weiss 1990) 26. Indirect costs arise as soon as stakeholders perceive a realistic 
chance of future bankruptcy. They refer to costs such as stakeholder protection costs, debt 
overhang (underinvestment) and asset substitution (risk shifting), reluctance to deal with the 
company (as suppliers and customers cannot be ensured that unsettled credits will be honored, 
warranties fulfilled, spare parts available, etc.) and employee turnover.  (Andrade & Kaplan 
1998)27.  
 
Non-systematic risk affects the probability of going bankrupt and therefore imposes costs. 
That may be one reason why management chooses to hedge on behalf of the shareholders. 
These costs are one reason why performance and market value might be directly associated 
with volatility (Haushalter 2000) 28.  Hedging will reduce the volatility of the firm’s cash 
flows or accounting profits and decreases the probability of bankruptcy. In turn, this will 
lower costs and boost value.  
 
Leverage is one of the most popular measures for financial distress costs.  The tax advantage 
of debt makes it possible to increase the value of the firm when increasing its debt. On the 
other hand, debt puts pressure on the firm, as payments of debts and interest constitute 
obligations which the debtholders are legally entitled. Employees are similarly legally entitled 
to their wages. If the company does not meet these obligations in time, it may encounter 
financial distress, and at the extreme, bankruptcy. If the capital markets were perfect (MM), 
bankruptcy would lead to a costless renegotiation of the company’s assets, ending in a transfer 
of assets from the shareholders to the debtholders. Smith and Stulz (1985) 29 argue that 
bankruptcy, and also the probability of future bankruptcy, creates significant costs for the 
company, which in turn have a negative impact on firm value in the real world.  If financial 
distress is costly, hedging activities may reduce the bankruptcy probability. They argue that 
hedging decreases the present value of financial distress costs even if hedging is costly, 
assuming that the investment policy is fixed. Expected loss of the debt tax shield will also be 
lower.  In these ways, shareholders’ wealth increases.  
                                                           
26
 Weiss, L.A. (1990) : Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, Journal of 
Financial Economics  27, pp. 285-314 
27
 Andrade, G and Kaplan (1998): How Costly is Financial (not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly 
Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, Journal of Finance 53 pp. 1443-1494 
28
 Haushalter, G.D (2002): Fiancing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas 
Producers, The Journal of Finance 55 (1), pp. 107-152 
29
 Smith, C.W. Jr and Stulz, R.M. (1985), "The determinants of firms' hedging policies", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20 No. 4, pp. 391-405 
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Simultaneously, risk management also raises the potential to carry debt. This leads to a higher 
optimal debt ratio or lower financing costs, and thus a higher value of the tax shield, since 
interest payments are tax-deductible.  
 
The figure illustrates how hedging lowers the costs of financial distress: 
 
Source:  Aretz,K ., Bartram,S.M. , Dufey,G. (2007) 30 
 
According to Dobson and Soenen (1993)31, hedging of foreign exchange will lower the 
probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, they argue that hedging tends to improve the moral-
hazard-agency problem. Moral hazard derives from conflicts of interest between company 
stakeholders. When the bankruptcy probability decreases, the perceived duration of 
contractual relations between stakeholders increases.  They also claim that when firms 
undertake international capital projects, uncertainty exists concerning the domestic currency 
value of the future cash flows from these projects.  Foreign exchange hedging reduces this 
uncertainty by smoothing the future cash flow stream.  This hedging can increase value, 
because when the cash flow is smoother, the cost of debt financing tends to be lower.  
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 Aretz,K ., Bartram,S.M. , Dufey,G. (2007): Why hedge? Rationales for corporate hedging and value 
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Bessembinder (1991)32 also show that hedging can create value by enhancing the debt 
contracting terms.   
 
The linkage between hedging and leverage is explored by Dolde (1995)33, Gould and 
Szimayer (2008)34. They unravel a previous puzzle in corporate finance, showing a significant 
positive relationship between hedging and leverage. They present evidence that hedging 
mitigates the effects of leverage on costs of financial distress.  
4.3.2.  Agency costs of debt 
Scholars describe agency costs of debt as the bondholders’ necessary compensation for 
managerial opportunism combined with the costs of writing and enforcing debt covenants.  
 
One agency conflict is referred to as the underinvestment problem. As opposed to the MM 
world, the real world consists of imperfect contracts and the interests of a firm’s stakeholders 
might not be congruent. This is especially the case when the firm is highly leveraged and 
when there are information asymmetries.  Firms with risky bonds outstanding and with low 
value are in particular those who may not have an optimal investment behavior.  This stems 
from the fact that, if fixed payment obligations are high, rational management may choose not 
to invest, even in positive NPV projects, as the realization of such investments primarily 
benefits bondholders (Myers, 1977) 35.  In other words, the problem results when firms find 
that external financing is sufficiently expensive and therefore must cut investment spending 
during times when internally generated cash flows are not sufficient to finance growth 
opportunities.  Hedging risks in this situation adds value because it helps ensure that the 
corporation has sufficient funds available to take advantage of attractive investment 
opportunities. Gay and Nam (1998)36 find evidence of a positive relation between a firm’s 
hedging activity and its growth opportunities. They also argue that the use of derivatives is 
partly driven by the need to avoid potential underinvestment problems.  
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 Bessembinder, H. (1991): Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects, 
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26 (4) pp. 519-532 
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Another agency conflict is referred to as the asset substitution problem or the risk shifting 
problem. This problem arises when the firm must select between mutually exclusive 
investment projects. When managers act in the interest of the shareholders, they have 
incentives to shift towards riskier projects, particularly when firm leverage is high and value 
low. This is because shareholders mainly receive the benefits of positive stock price 
developments while bondholders suffer the consequences of negative price developments. 
Shareholders have a call-option like claim on the firm’s assets (Merton 1974)37. According to 
option theory, shareholders will be interested in the upside and the volatility, since volatility 
increases the value of the option. Bondholders, on the other hand, will be concerned about the 
downside and the risk of bankruptcy. When choosing among projects with different riskiness, 
management can therefore increase the value of equity at the expense of the value of the debt.  
However, bondholders can protect themselves by designing debt covenants that protect their 
interests. Smith (1995)38 indicates that risk management may prevent a drop in firm value to a 
point where there are strong incentives to increase risk. These incentives are usually the 
strongest when the value is low, and where the transfer of wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders is largest.  
 
Based on agency costs, Dobson & Soenen (1993) discuss three sound reasons why 
management should manage risk.  As mentioned, hedging smoothes cash flows and thereby 
reduces uncertainty which in turn will lower the cost of external financing. Since management 
bear agency costs, assuming asymmetric information between managers and bondholders, 
hedging will increase the value of the company. Management will therefore rationally choose 
to hedge. Second, when the firm is leveraged, cash flow smoothing through exchange risk 
hedging will tend ameliorate the risk-shifting agency problem.  The third argument states that 
hedging increases duration of contractual relations between stakeholders, because the 
probability of financial distress is lower.  
4.3.3.  Imperfect Markets and Costly External Financing 
Hypotheses exist why corporate risk management is a result of market imperfections. If 
access to external debt or equity financing is costly, and the firm is dependent on external 
financing to realize investment opportunities, it will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall 
in their funds.  Otherwise, a visit to the capital market would be very costly.  Froot, 
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Scharfstein and Stein (1993)39 argue that market imperfections are the reason why external 
funds are more costly than internally generated funds.  Transaction costs to obtain external 
financing, imperfect information as to the riskiness of the investment opportunities present in 
the firm, and the high costs of potential bankruptcy are among the imperfections.  Other 
things equal, the harder it is for a firm to obtain external financing, the more costly a shortfall 
in cash flow will be. Hence, benefit from hedging is greater.  Haushalter (2002) supports this 
theory and shows that companies that are more likely to face market imperfections, hedges 
risk more actively.  
 
Even though there are benefits from hedging, and the firm is less dependent on the capital 
market, it does not automatically translate to value added. Tufano (1998)40 shows that hedging 
in fact can result in overinvestment, i.e. investing in negative NPV projects.  
4.3.4.  Reducing tax burden 
Companies often face convex tax-schedules, i.e. the tax rate increases with higher income. In 
this context, Graham and Smith (1999)41 points out that about half of the 80,000 firms they 
investigated had tax-based incentives to reduce the pre-tax income volatility. This goes also 
for firms that are not 100 % able to carry forward their losses to future periods. A stable 
income will minimize the tax payments and thus increase shareholder value.  Mayers and 
Smith (1982)42 provides evidence that firms with more convex tax schedules engages more in 
hedging activities while Mian (1996)43 argues that there is no relation between hedging  and 
progressive tax schedules, and between hedging and the incidence of carry-forward tax losses. 
Instead, he found a relationship between foreign tax credit (proxy for tax shield) and hedging.  
4.4.  Managerial Utility Maximization Hypothesis 
4.4.1.  Undiversified management  
Shareholders can usually diversify away the unsystematic risk of their positions, while this is 
more difficult for managers at the personal level. The difficulty arises because of the tied 
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relationship between managers and the firm. They often have proportions of their wealth 
invested in the firm; they have worked there for several years, have obtained specific 
expertise and have a reputation to protect.  Because of this, conflicts resulting from the 
principle-agent relationship between shareholders and managers might emerge.  Managers 
might take actions that benefit themselves more than the shareholders. Such actions may be 
conglomerate mergers or sub-optimal debt-ratios, as they decrease the risk of their own 
wealth position (Bodnar et al., 1997)44.  Agency costs incur in the shareholders effort to 
reduce this non-maximizing behavior, e.g. through monitoring.  
4.4.2.  Incentive structures 
Managers are hired by the shareholders to act in their interest, which is usually maximizing 
their wealth. It is then important that management have the right incentives to ensure goal 
congruency. Risk management might lower the agency costs, because it lowers the risk of 
profitable growth opportunities. The variability of firm value will decrease and give the 
managers less incentive to engage in non-value maximizing activities deriving from different 
risk preferences. Smith and Stulz (1985) discuss how the compensation scheme influences 
managers hedging choices. When the scheme includes option-like provisions, the managers 
have more incentive to take on more risk. The authors of the article conclude that managers 
therefore hedge less.  The same cannot be said when a substantial portion of the compensation 
takes form of shares itself (i.e. the compensation follows the stock price movements one to 
one). Bartram (2000)45 argues that this will intensify the undiversified managers’ risk 
aversion.  
 
There are several factors that the management cannot control, e.g. interest rate risk and 
currency risk.  The stock price performance may therefore not be a good indicator of the 
management quality in the absence of risk management. Due to this influence of risks 
unrelated to management performance on stock price, management compensation schemes are 
rendered less effective, as they sometimes reward poorly performing and reward well-
performing managers.  However, hedging can reduce the effects of unrelated financial risks 
on company value and therefore strengthen the relationship between share price and 
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management performance. Campbell and Kracaw (1987)46 claim that it will also be easier to 
distinguish efficient and inefficient managers.   
4.4.3.  Asymmetric information and reputation  
Breeden and Viswananthan (2002)47 put forward a different theory about hedging and this is 
based on asymmetric information and management reputation.  They dispute that executives 
may hedge risks so as to better communicate their skills to the labor market. They claim that 
younger managers are more open to new concepts like risk management, than their not so 
young counterparts.  This might be explained by the facts that younger managers have less 
developed reputations and would therefore have an incentive to signal their quality through 
hedging.   
 
May(1995)48 contradicts this relationship and argues that managers’ years with the firm 
should be negatively related to the risk characteristics of the firm, and therefore creating more 
incentives to hedge. The reason is that managerial skills become more firm-specific as time 
goes by.  If diversification reduces human capital risk, firms with “old” managers are more 
likely to pursue risk management.  Tufano (1996)49 tested the assumptions and found only a 
negative relation between CFO age and hedging activities, while no relationship with CEO 
and hedging activities. He also found that the number of years the CFO has been with a firm 
is negatively related to hedging.  
4.5.  Other rationales for corporate hedging 
4.5.1.  Ownership concentration 
As previously explained, corporate hedging may be explained by agency conflicts between 
managers, shareholders and debtholders. Corporate governance characteristics should affect 
hedging policy because corporate governance is the market solution to the agency problems. 
Agency costs are generally lower in firms characterized by high ownership concentration and 
should hedge mainly in order to maximize their value. Larger shareholders have both 
resources and incentive to exercise strict monitoring of the managers activities, and thus 
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reducing their incentives to hedge in their own interests. Lel (2004)50 examines the effect of 
large inside and outside shareholders and suggest that the presence of an inside blockholder 
decreases the likelihood of hedging while the presence of an outside blockholder or /and an 
institutional blockholder increases this likelihood.   
4.5.2.  Board characteristics 
There are also theories based on the board characteristics. Whidbee and Wohar (1999)51 were 
the first to explore the link between derivatives use and the board independence, measured by 
the proportion of outside directors in the board. It should be noted that it can be difficult to 
distinguish inside investors from outside investors, and therefore also difficult to measure the 
board independence. They suggest that hedging activities are influenced by outside directors’ 
presence only at low levels of insiders’ shareholdings. The explanation for this is that 
managers that own a small fraction of the company’s shares are more likely to be disciplined 
after poor performance.  In this situation, managers will usually seek more hedging.  
Borokhovich et. al (2004)52 investigated whether hedging activities can be explained by board 
size  and the presence of a bank executive on the board, but found no relationship.  Evidence 
suggesting that the financial education of the board and the audit committee affect hedging is 
found by Dionne and Triki (2005)53, but this topic is quite new in risk management theory and 
is expected to develop in near future.  
4.5.3.  Country-specific characteristics.  
Risk management strategies can be affected by informational and institutional environment. 
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999)54 applied a matched-industry procedure and concluded that 
German firms hedge more with derivatives than US firms. Bodnar, De Jong and Macrae 
(2003)55 find a similar relationship between Dutch firms and US firms. They explain this by 
the fact that Dutch firms may be more exposed to currency risk than the US counterparts 
together with differences in economy orientation and the presence of a legal structure that is 
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more protective of shareholder rights in the US. Lel (2004) takes into consideration financial 
market developments, legal and macroeconomic characteristics of the country as possible 
reasons for differences in hedging strategies. He argues that firms in emerging economies face 
higher macroeconomic risk and are therefore more likely to use hedging instruments.  
4.5.4.  Size 
According to the Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) model, firms that have costly external 
financing should be more likely to hedge. Smaller firms suffer more to informational 
asymmetries and more costly financing, and should therefore hedge more. On the contrary, if 
hedging costs are fixed, larger firms should engage more in risk management activities 
because they are costly activities that smaller firms cannot afford. Another rationale for large 
firms to hedge is because they have more geographically dispersed operations and faces risks 
on several levels.  Several scholars have reported a relationship between size and hedging 
activity, such as Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and Haushalter (2002).  
4.6.  Substitutes to hedging with derivatives 
Risk management does not necessarily translate to derivatives. In literature, three techniques 
are mentioned to serve as alternatives to derivatives hedging 
4.6.1.  Risk management through operation activities 
It is not easy to measure hedging through operations, but Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000)56 
argues that firms with operating costs flexibility are less likely to hedge with financial 
instruments. Diversified firms face less non-systematic risk and will therefore not be as likely 
to hedge. Diversification can in other words be a substitute to the use of derivatives.  
4.6.2.  Risk management through financing activities 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993)57 introduced a theory that says the usage of preferred 
stocks and convertible debt as substitutes to hedging. External financing in the form of 
preferred stock or convertible debt reduces the probability of financial distress compared to 
regular debt. It follows that the need for hedging decreases.  
                                                           
56
 Petersen, M and Thiagarajan, R. (2000): Empirical Measurement and Hedging: With and Without Derivatives, 
Financial Management 29(4), pp. 5-30 
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 Nance, D., Smith, C. Jr and Smithson, C. (1993): On The Determinants Of Corporate Hedging, The Journal of 
Finance 48 (1), pp. 267-284 
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4.6.3.  Liquidity buffers 
The first two alternatives are substitutes for financial instruments, while a liquidity buffer is a 
substitute for hedging regardless of instruments used to manage risk.  Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) claim that a retention of earnings (instead of paying it out as dividends) will 
build a liquidity buffer that can be used when firms need cash or faces volatile earnings.  
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CHAPTER 5:  HEDGING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
5.1.  Introduction 
Hedging using jet kerosene is preferable for an airliner because it fully reflects the commodity 
that the airline needs to operate its fleet. However, apart from the little-traded Japanese 
market, there are no exchange traded futures available for jet fuel, although OTC-trades can 
be arranges.  This involves counterparty risk for both sides, and thus financially weak airlines 
would find it hard to find others willing to take this risk.  We will now present available 
substitutes.  
5.2.  Hedging instruments used by airlines 
5.2.1.  “Plain vanilla swap” 
A plain vanilla swap is an off-balance-sheet agreement where a floating price is exchanged 
for a fixed price over a certain period of time. The name is derived from the fact that it is 
simple and basic compared to more exotic swap contracts. The contract is purely a financial 
agreement, and does not include physical delivery of the commodity itself.  The contractual 
obligations are settled in cash.  A fuel swap specifies volume, duration and the fixed floating 
prices for fuel.  The difference between the floating and fixed price are settled in cash for 
specific period. This is typically monthly, but sometimes also quarterly, semi-annually or 
annually. The airline is typically the fixed price payer.  
5.2.2.  Differential swaps and basis risk 
The plain vanilla swap is based on price differences for the same commodity. A differential 
swap is based on the price difference between a fixed differential for two different 
commodities and their actual differential over a period.  These swaps can be used to manage 
the basis risk58 from other hedging activities. Some airlines hedge their jet fuel exposure using 
plain vanilla swaps on highly correlated commodities, such as heating oil.  The airline can 
then use an additional contract, a differential swap for jet fuel versus heating oil, to hedge the 
basis risk from the first contract.  In this way the airline can eliminate the risk that jet fuel 
price rise more than the price of heating oil.  
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 Basis risk is defined as the risk that offsetting investments in a hedging strategy will not experience price 
changes in entirely opposite directions from each other. This imperfect correlation between the two 
investments creates the potential for excess gains or losses in a hedging strategy, thus adding risk to the 
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5.2.3 Call options 
A call option gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular asset at a 
predetermined fixed price at a time up until the maturity date.  OTC options on oil are usually 
settled in cash while exchange-traded oil options on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) are exercised into futures contracts.  OTC option settlement is usually based on the 
average price for a period, normally a calendar month. Airlines like settlement against average 
prices because they usually refuel their aircrafts several times a day.  Since they are 
effectively paying an average price during the month, they typically prefer to settle hedges 
against an average price, called average price options. 
 
Options are often used to hedge cross-market risk in the energy industry, especially when 
market liquidity is an issue. An airline may buy an option on heating oil as a cross-market 
hedge against a rise in the jet fuel price. Such hedges should only be used if the prices are 
highly correlated.  
 
Airlines value the flexibility that energy options give, but these options can be expensive 
compared to other available options. The prices of commodities are often very volatile, giving 
such options great value and therefore great premiums.  
5.2.4. Collars 
An alternative to buying expensive option is to use collars. A collar is a combination of a call 
and put option.  For a commodity-buying hedger, it is created by selling a put option with a 
price below the current commodity price and purchasing a call option with a strike price 
above the current commodity price. The premium received by selling the put option is used to 
purchase the call option and thus offset some / all of the costs. A “zero cost collar” is 
established when the premium received from the put options exactly offsets the premium paid 
for the call options. This collar strategy ensures a minimum and maximum price for the 
commodity for a certain period.   A “premium collar” occurs when the hedger wants more 
protection from upward price movements, or more benefit from declining prices. That is, 
having a lower call option strike price and selling a put option with a lower strike price.  With 
this collar the premium from the put option only partly offset the cost of the call option.  
 
- 34 - 
 
Using a zero-cost collar may seem reasonable since it involves no or low upfront costs,  but 
the company may ending up buying fuel at higher prices than their un-hedged competitors (or 
companies that did not employ a collar strategy)  in the event of a price drop.  
5.2.5. Futures and forward contracts 
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a specified quantity and quality of a 
commodity for a predetermined price at a predetermined time in the future. The buyer has a 
long position, meaning an obligation to purchase the commodity while the seller has a short 
position, meaning an obligation to sell the commodity. Futures contracts are standardized (e.g. 
quantity, quality, delivery, etc.) and traded on an exchange.  They also eliminate counterparty 
risk (a clearing house guarantees the financial performance of contracts with the help of 
margin requirements. Only a small percentage of contracts result in physical delivery (Less 
than 1% according to NYMEX). Instead buyers or sellers offset their positions. The main 
exchanges offering oil contracts are the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) in London 
and NYMEX.   
 
A forward contract is the same as a futures contract except for two important differences. 
First, forwards are typically customized and not traded on organized exchanges, i.e. “OTC”.  
Second, forwards are settled at maturity, whereas futures are marked to market daily. The 
purchaser has full counterparty risk.   
5.3. Instrument suitability 
The most liquid market available for closely related products is oil, with contracts available in 
Brent crudes and WTI crudes. No market exists for OPEC produced oil products, although the 
price for these products tracks Brent and WTI crudes closely. The higher the correlation 
between jet fuel and the commodity hedged the better suitability. Below it is illustrated how 
the related products correlate with jet fuel59.  
New York 
Harbor 
Kerosene-
Type Jet Fuel
 U.S. Gulf 
Coast 
Kerosene-
Type Jet Fuel 
 Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-
Antwerp (ARA) 
Kerosene-Type 
Jet Fuel 
Cushing, OK WTI Spot 0.6717 0.7423 0.6935
Europe Brent Spot 0.6975 0.7652 0.7404
New York Harbor No. 2 Heating Oil 0.9121 0.8215 0.7408
U.S. Gulf Coast No. 2 Heating Oil 0.8808 0.9285 0.7944
Correlations of return with jet fuel
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 Calculated using data collected from IEA (1986-2009). See table 6 in the appendix for a full matrix.  
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The correlations60 between returns of jet fuel, oil and heating oil prices are ranging from 
0.6717 to 0.9285. Heating oil has a higher correlation with jet fuel prices than oil which is not 
surprising since heating oil and jet fuel are both refined products. It is worth mentioning that 
the return of jet fuel prices in Amsterdam is less correlated with the return of oil and heating 
oil prices than jet fuel in the US. The rationale for this is there are no prices available for 
heating oil in Europe.  
5.4. Fuel hedging behavior in the European airline industry 
5.4.1.  Trend in hedging levels 
In the years from 2001 and 2008 almost all the sample companies hedged parts of their jet 
fuel consumption.  The companies apply different strategies with different derivatives61.  We 
have seen how oil and jet fuel prices have reach record prices together with a high volatility. 
It is tempting to believe that this may have caused airlines to hedge more of their fuel 
requirements.  The first interesting thing to notice is that hedging levels have not been 
significantly changed during the years from 2001 to 2008. At fiscal year end the development 
of next year’s fuel requirement hedged is illustrated below: 
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In fact, industry aggregate hedging levels are lower in 2008 than in 2001.  It is dangerous to 
draw conclusions, because we have missing observations for several airlines both in the 
beginning and the end of the period. 
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 See table 5 in the appendix for a full table of correlations. 
61
 See table 6 in the appendix for a full summary of each airline’s hedging behavior at year end for the period. 
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5.4.2.  Instruments used 
Each company has different hedging strategies. Some companies use only fixed price 
contracts (futures or swaps) while others use options or option-structures (collars or zero-cost 
collars) and some a combination of fixed price. The strategy also changes over time. All the 
companies have used both fixed-price contracts and options to hedge their fuel costs, except 
Ryanair and Norwegian, that rely solely on fixed-price contracts. For all the companies 
together, fixed-price contracts were used in 86% of the observations while options were used 
in 78%. The maturities of the hedges are also variable and may change over time and from 
company to company. For the entire sample, the average maturity of hedges was 1,67 years, 
ranging from 0,5 years for Norwegian to four years for Air France-KLM.   
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CHAPTER 6:  THE VALUE AND DETERMINANTS OF JET FUEL 
HEDGING 
6.1. Does hedging add value? 
We have seen that jet fuel costs constitute a large portion of an airline’s operating expenses 
and witnessed how price levels and variation has caused great uncertainty. Since so many 
airlines are hedging this risk, it is time to turn to the important question; does hedging add 
value to a firm?  
Allayannis and Weston (2001)62 conclude that foreign currency hedging increases firm value 
with approximately 5% after examining a large sample of US non-financial firms from 1990 
to 1995. Carter et al. (2006)63 found that jet fuel hedging is associated with a premium of 
about 10% for US airline shares in the period 1992-2003. On the other hand, Jin and Jorion 
(2006) could not find any evidence of increased value for US oil- and gas producers that 
hedge oil price in the period 1998-2001. Chang et al (2005) actually finds that oil production 
hedging for Canadian firms is negatively related to firm value while gas reserve hedging is 
positively related.  
As we know, there has not been performed a similar test for European airlines with regards to 
jet fuel hedging. Fuel prices have been higher and more volatile recent years, so an 
investigation of this market is very interesting. We will now go through the set-up of our 
regression analyses.  
6.1.1. Regression analysis 
We have chosen to perform a regression analysis to try and answer the question whether fuel 
hedging adds value or not. We need information about how much airlines hedge, and such 
information is found from annual reports, 10-k filings and other sources on each airline’s 
website. The measure of hedging level we use is the percentage hedged of next year’s 
expected fuel requirements at the fiscal year end. We have aborted observations where this 
percentage is absent in the regressions. In addition to this percentage, we include a hedging 
dummy if the firm hedges more than 0%. Since different companies report in different 
currencies we transform all numbers into euro equivalents.  
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 Allaynnis, G. and Weston, J. (2001): The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value, Review 
of Financial Studies 14, pp. 243-276 
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 Carter, D., Rogers, D.A. and Simkins, B.J. (2006): Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US 
Airline Industry, Financial Management 35 (1) 
- 38 - 
 
Dependent variable 
We have chosen to use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value. This Q is defined as a ratio of 
market value of financial claims on the firm to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets. The 
ratio was originally developed by James Tobin (1969)64 . However, the initial Q requires 
hard-to-obtain data and complex computations. We have therefore chosen to use a simple 
approximation of Q, developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994)65: 
 
This approximation is easier to calculate and data is available from the Compustat database as 
well as annual reports. The authors also found a high correlation between the simple 
approximation and the more complex calculations.  
Other control variables 
Fuel hedging could be one source of value for an airline. But there are many other variables 
that may also contribute to the value of a firm. We want to control for these by constructing 
the following control variables: 
Size: Evidence that size attributes to firm value is ambiguous. However, since a hedging 
program can be costly to start and manage, large companies may be more likely to use 
derivatives in risk management than small firms. The natural logarithm of total assets is used 
to control for size.  
Financial constraints: Hedgers may forgo projects because they are unable to obtain sufficient 
financing. Q may remain high because they only invest in positive NPV projects. We use a 
dividend dummy to proxy for the ability to access financial markets. If the firm pays a 
dividend, it is less likely to be capital constrained, but may also lack investment (growth) 
opportunities. The dividend factor is therefore expected to be negatively related to Q66. We 
also include other variables to adjust for capital constraints: cash divided by sales, operating 
cash flow divided by sales and EBIT67/interest expenses (Interest coverage). 
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 Tobin, J (1969): A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, Journal of Money Credit and Banking 1 
(1) pp. 15-29 
65
 Chung, K.H and Pruitt, S.W (1994): A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s Q, Financial Management 23, pp. 70-
74 
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 Brealey, R.A and Myers, S.C (2007): Corporate Finance, 8
th
 edition. McGraw Hill 
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 EBIT: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
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Capital structure: Leverage can both have a positive and negative effect on firm value. Since 
interest expenses are tax deductible, leverage can provide a tax shield. On the other hand, as 
leverage increases so does the probability of bankruptcy and the costs of distress. Book value 
of long-term debt divided by total assets is used to control for differences in capital structure.  
Profitability: A profitable firm is more likely to trade at higher premiums than less profitable 
firms. To control for this we have included net income divided by total assets in the previous 
year (ROA) 
Investment opportunities: Firms with investment opportunities are also more likely to have a 
higher market value. Firms that hedge may also have more opportunities when they gain on 
their hedges. Investment opportunities are defined as capital expenditures divided by sales.  
Insider ownership:  Insider ownership typically has strong signaling effect. When insiders 
(executives / board of directors) buys and own shares, this is typically a sign that the shares 
are undervalued and a sign of good future profitability. A high ownership could also be seen 
as incentives to do a good job as a manager, since they have a lot of their own wealth invested 
in the company. We use the natural logarithm of the executives’ share value and expect it to 
be positively related to firm value.  
Use of other hedging instruments: In our sample, the companies are exposed to other market 
risks than jet fuel price uncertainty. The two most common risks are interest rates and foreign 
currency. As mentioned, Allayannis and Weston (2001)68 found that foreign currency hedgers 
have a higher Q than non-hedgers. We control for this by including a foreign currency 
hedging dummy. It is more difficult to control for interest hedging since it is hard to 
distinguish fixed-rate loans from swaps and contracts. 
Model set-up 
We have done regressions for European, US and for both markets’ firms together. Two 
models have been applied; one where we include the percentage hedged (Model 1) and 
another where we include a hedging dummy if a company hedge or not (Model 2). Since 
almost all European airlines hedge, the dummy variable is not so meaningful. 
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 Allaynnis, G. and Weston, J. (2001): The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value, Review 
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6.1.2. Results 
The regression analyses yield several interesting results69. For European companies the 
hedging percentage variable has a positive coefficient of 0.4446 and is statistical significant70 
(p-value 0.0270). This means that for our sample, firms that hedge have a higher value 
measured by Tobin’s Q71.  The coefficient translates to a stock premium of 44.46 % for firms 
hedging 100%. An average hedging level of 47% and a coefficient of 0.4446 translate to a 
premium of 20.6 % (coefficient * average hedging %) for our sample firms in the whole 
period. However, we believe it is difficult to label the premium with a specific percentage, but 
the results indicate that hedging adds value, anyway.  
Other variables also explain firm value. A coefficient of -0.2355 and a p-value of 0.000 show 
that firm size negatively affects firm value. A possible explanation may be that the biggest 
firms are usually the traditional carriers with a well established route network and business. 
These may be tied to “old cost structures” (different types of aircraft, labor unions and high 
salaries, etc.) and lack of growth opportunities.   
Dividend payments are also negatively related to value. The dividend indicator has a 
coefficient of -0.2420 and a p-value of 0.016. This could be explained by a lack of investment 
opportunities and therefore less growth opportunities. Such firms may have a lower market to 
book value72 
Variables that affect Q positively are ROA and operating cash flow to sales with coefficients 
of 2.2006 and 2.2777 with p-values of 0.028 and 0.000, respectively. This is not surprising, 
since profitable firms typically have higher values. On the other hand, a start-up firm may 
have low ROA and negative cash flows. The market could despite this expect that the future is 
bright. However, our results indicate that ROA and operating cash flow to sales explain 
higher firm values.  
For US airlines the results are quite similar. The coefficient of percentage hedged is 0.4127 
with a p-value of 0.0720 in model 1. In model 2, a dummy variable is used if a company 
hedges. This indicator has a coefficient of 0.2994 and a p-value of 0.004. In other word, both 
our models suggest that hedging adds value to a hedging firm. An average percentage hedged 
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 See table 7 in the appendix for a full regression summary.   
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 For the results, p-values below 0.01 is statistical significant at the 99% confidence level, p-values below 0.05 
is statistical significant at the 95% confidence level and p-values below 0.10 is statistical significant at the 90 % 
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of 19% and a coefficient of 0.4127 yields a premium of 7.9%. The hedging indicator can itself 
be translated to a hedging premium. Since the coefficient is 0.2994, a premium of 29.94% is 
present in our sample. The difference between 7.9% and 29.94% is huge; this also shows that 
it is dangerous for us to but an absolute value on the value of hedging. But as for the 
European companies, there seems to be a positive relation between hedging and value.  
There are two main differences between our US and European samples. The first is that the 
value of executive owned shares has a positive influence on Q with coefficients of 0.0750 and 
0.0584, p-values of 0.003 and 0.023 in model 1 and 2 respectively..  
The other difference is that some American airlines use pass-through agreements to pass on 
fuel cost increases to partner airlines. Companies that have such agreements are more likely to 
have higher values of Q since the coefficients in model 1 and 2 are 0.4576 and 0.5070 and 
have p-values of 0.000 and 0.000.   
6. 2  Value of hedging in different time periods 
We have previously shown that the uncertainty in general and volatility in fuel prices in 
particular has been increasing over the last two years. It is therefore interesting to see whether 
hedging is more valuable in these years. If hedging adds value to a firm (as indicated in the 
precious regressions), we intuitively expect that hedging adds even more value in periods of 
high volatility.     
6.2.1 Regression analysis 
We have split the regression performed above into two; one for the years 2001 – 2006 and the 
other for the years 2007 – 2008. In this way, we can see whether there is a difference in the 
relation between hedging and value for different time periods.  
6.2.2  Results 
For the years ranging from 2001 to 2006 the % hedged-variable is statistically significant at 
99% confidence level for European airlines and 95% confidence level for European and 
American airlines all together73. The hedge dummy variable is statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level for American airlines. These are the same results we got from the regression 
for the whole period of 2001 -2008.  
We are particularly interested in the years 2007-2008. These were years with an increasing 
uncertainty; rising fuel prices, higher volatility and the global financial crisis. If hedging is 
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valuable because the future is uncertain, it should intuitively be even more valuable when this 
uncertainty increases. However, in these years only the hedging dummy variable for 
American airlines is statistically significant at a 90% confidence level74. We find this result 
surprising.  
The oil price was increasing during the years from 2001 to 2006, which may explain why 
investors value hedging more. If each year, the expectations were a further increase in prices, 
hedging would decrease costs in the future and, hence, hedging is valued.  
In the last year, declining oil prices has lead to a loss on the various hedging instruments. 
Being hedged for many years with a high locked-in jet fuel price will result in more costs than 
competitors with less or no hedge at all. If investors think the trend in the oil price is declining 
it is reasonable to believe they value hedging less. In 2008, the year with the beginning of the 
financial crisis, there were (and still is) a lot of financial challenges, uncertainty and deviation 
from fundamentals in valuation of companies. This would make it more difficult to extract the 
hedging impact from all the data we have collected.  We also suffer from few observations in 
the years 2007-2008. Our results could implicate that the % hedging variable is not significant 
during 2007 – 2008. Further studies and more observations are required to conclude whether 
hedging adds value in this period. 
6.3 Determinants of jet fuel hedging 
The risk management strategies vary from firm to firm. The next question we try to answer is: 
What determines an airline’s choice of hedging? More specific we look for variables that can 
explain the level of hedging. The theory chapter lists many reasons why non-financial firms 
hedge. We want to check whether these theories applies to the airline’s hedging decisions75. 
6.3.1 Regression analysis 
In this regression we use a lot of the same data and variables from the previous regressions.  
Dependent variable 
As a measurement of hedging behavior we use the percentage of next year’s expected fuel 
requirements hedged at fiscal-year end.  
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Independent variables 
We use the same variables as in the previous regressions. In addition, we include the fuel cost 
percentage of operating expenses as we intuitively suspect that this must somehow be related 
to the hedging decisions.  
6.3.2 Results 
For European companies, we found four explanatory variables76. First, size explains hedging 
behavior77. With a coefficient of 0.1341 and a p-value of 0.000 we conclude that bigger firms 
hedge more than smaller firms. The reason may be that it is costly to set up and manage a 
hedging program and that big firms can afford this. The absolute amount of money at risk is 
also higher for biggest firms. Another rationale for large firms to hedge is because they have 
more geographically dispersed operations and faces risks on several levels 
Second, firms that pay dividends hedge more than firms that does not. This is somewhat 
surprising, since we may expect capital constrained firms (typically firms that does not pay 
dividends) to hedge their margins. The coefficient for the hedging dummy is 0.1223 and the 
p-value is 0.059.  
Third, the debt ratio is negatively related to hedging levels78. This is may also be surprising, 
since leveraged firms may be more risky and hence be more interested in hedging this risk. 
The coefficient is -0.9411 and the p-value is 0.  
The last statistically significant variable is CAPEX/sales79. With a coefficient of 0.6147 and a 
p-value of 0.069, we see that firms that invest much tend to hedge more. This may be because 
they want to hedge future investment opportunities, i.e. make sure they have sufficient cash 
for future investments. 
What we found surprising, was that jet fuel’s share of operating expenses did not show any 
significance at all. If jet fuel constitutes a large portion of expenses, and jet fuel prices are 
volatile, intuition says that the company may hedge. Size showed a positive relation to 
hedging levels, and big companies have typically lower jet fuel costs as percentage of 
operating expenses. This can explain why we did not find any significance.  
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Another surprising part of the regression results, was that foreign hedging activity did not 
seem to be adding value, as opposed to jet fuel hedging. This may be explained by the fact 
that information available on currency hedging is hard to interpret, and a hedging dummy 
variable may therefore not be the best suited variable to include. Moreover, most companies 
hedge currency exposure, so that we have few observations of companies that do not hedge. 
For the US sample, size and dividend dummy can explain hedging behavior, just like the 
European ones. The coefficients were 0.0243 and 0.1593 and the p-values 0.049 and 0.005 
respectively. In addition to these, foreign currency and cash/sales shows statistically 
significant. Firms that hedge foreign currency, tends to hedge less jet fuel. The coefficient is -
0.1022 and the p-value is 0.060. The cash/sales variable has a coefficient of 0.4134 and a p-
value of 0.046. Another remark worth noticing is that the value of executive shares seems 
positively related to hedging levels, but it is not possible to conclude since p-value is 0.118 
The combined sample yields much the same results. Size and dividends are positively related 
to hedging levels with coefficients of 0.0424 and 0.1565 and p-values of 0.001 and 0.001. 
Debt ratio has a coefficient of -0.3443 and a p-value of 0.001. In addition to these variables, 
Tobin’s Q shows a positive relation to hedging levels. The coefficient is 0.1272 and the p-
value is 0.001.  
6.4 How does jet fuel hedging add value? 
We have found that jet fuel hedging correlates positively with firm value. This leads to the 
next important question: Why? 
6.4.1 Reduction of the underinvestment problem? 
The variables explaining why European airlines hedge are size80 (+), dividends (-), debt ratio 
(-) and investment levels (+). We believe that one or more of these variables therefore can 
give insights about why hedging adds value.  
Size and value were negatively related in our first regression (hedging vs. value) while it was 
positively related in the second (determinants of hedging), so we exclude this variable 
immediately.  
Dividends, debt ratio and investment levels are interrelated in business. If you pay dividends 
you are not likely to be capital constrained, and there may not be a need for rapidly payment 
of debt. In addition, economic theory says that if the company has positive net present value 
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investment opportunities, income should be reinvested in the business instead of being paid 
out as dividends. Dividend payments may therefore be evidence of few investment 
opportunities.  If you invest you can do this either by internal finances81 or borrow money. 
Big established companies tend to have more (positive) stable cash flows, but also a lower 
market to book value because of fewer growth opportunities. Since they are bigger and more 
stable, this may increase their ability to carry debt and may be a reason why debt ratio is 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q82.  
Since investment levels shows statistical significance as an explanatory variable in both the 
value regression and the determinants regression, we suspect that airlines hedge because they 
want to decrease the underinvestment problem (decrease the costs of financial distress).  
Another reason why we believe this is because Tobin’s Q is positively related to hedging 
levels.  
Froot et. Al (1993) developed a theoretical framework for hedging and value. Based on this 
framework, Carter et. al (2006) showed that for American airlines, the hedging premium was 
related to the underinvestment problem. We follow the footsteps of Carter et. al, we try to see 
whether this is the answer to the European market as well.  
The framework applied in the airline industry implies that the higher the correlation between 
jet fuel costs and investment combined with a negative relation between jet fuel costs and 
cash flow, the greater the benefit of hedging.  
We have already shown that there is a negative relation between jet fuel costs and cash flow 
in chapter 3. Unfortunately, we are not able to find a positive relation between jet fuel costs 
and investment levels. We can therefore not use this framework to conclude.  
Our hypothesis that the value added derives from alleviation of the underinvestment problem 
is inconclusive, but there are several intuitive arguments that the added value from hedging is 
related to the underinvestment problem. 
When airline purchases aircraft, this process takes several years and aircraft is typically very 
expensive. If the payment is settled years from now, it is important to have the cash at the 
settlement date. Hedging reduces this uncertainty. To illustrate this point consider the 
                                                           
81
 Internal finances is money retained equity from income. Income can either be distributed to shareowner as 
dividend or retained in the business to finance investments.  
82
 Brealey, R.A and Myers, S.C (2007): Corporate Finance, 8
th
 edition. McGraw Hill 
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following: An airline company decides to buy aircraft with delivery four years from now. If 
the company does not hedge fuel costs, and jet fuel prices boost, the company may not have 
the cash for the aircraft. If investors believe investments in new aircraft are positive net 
present value projects at the settlement date, the company suffers from underinvestment 
because they cannot afford the aircraft. If the company had hedged the price of fuel, they may 
have had sufficient funds. The company therefore would have been better off if they have 
hedged, and investors would value hedges in place at the ordering date.  
When airlines face financial trouble, many companies are forced to sell assets (aircraft) below 
market prices. This is direct costs of financial distress. If the company had hedged, this may 
have been avoided. Moreover, these aircraft is being bought by other companies. If these 
companies have hedged, they are able to do even larger investments at below market prices. 
So there are two arguments for valuing hedges in light of costs of financial distress.   
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSIONS & REMARKS 
In this thesis we have examined the jet fuel hedging behavior in the European airline industry 
as well compared this industry to the US industry. More specific, we have tried to see whether 
jet fuel hedging leads to a higher firm value and why airlines chooses to hedge. The period 
ranges from 2001 to 2008. The availability and collection of information is limited and time-
consuming, resulting in few possible ways to measure impacts of hedging. The sample ended 
up consisting of 14 European airlines and 15 American.  
 
Our results show that, for European airlines hedging is positively related to Tobin’s Q with a 
coefficient of  0.4446 and a p-value of 0.027. The coefficient can be seen as a 44.46% 
premium of an airline hedging 100% of its fuel requirements. Since the average percentage 
hedged over the period is 47%, the average premium for the sample firms is 20.6%. This is 
higher than the premium of 10% found by Carter et. al.(2006). However, the standard error of 
the coefficient is large, so we believe it is difficult to put an absolute number on the premium.  
 
For the American companies the results were similar. In addition to the hedging % as an 
independent variable, we included a hedging dummy variable (1 if % hedged is larger than 
zero, 0 if zero) in a second, separate model. The coefficient of this dummy can be considered 
as a hedging premium of the company stock. The coefficient of percentage hedged is 0.4127 
with a p-value of 0.0720 in model 1. This leads to a hedging premium of 7.9%. In model 2, 
where we included the hedging dummy, the coefficient was 0.2994 with a p-value of 0.004. 
This translates to a premium of 29.94%. Since the difference between 7.9% and 29.94% is 
huge, we believe that it is also here dangerous to put an absolute number of the value of 
hedges.  
 
Our best guess is that the hedging premium is related to the underinvestment problem, since 
the intuition behind the argument is logically sound.  
 
If hedging adds value because of uncertainty, we expect it to be valued even more when this 
uncertainty increases. We therefore split the regression analysis into two, one for the period 
2001-2006 and the other from 2007-2008. While the first period showed similar results as the 
entire period, the last period did surprisingly not show the same.  
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However, a criticism to these results is few observations which weaken the conclusion.  
 
We also tried to search for the determinants of jet fuel hedging decisions, i.e. what can explain 
the level of hedging.  For European companies, we found four explanatory variables. First, 
size explains hedging behavior. With a coefficient of 0.1341 and a p-value of 0.000 we 
conclude that bigger firms hedge more than smaller firms.  
Second, firms that pay dividends hedge more than firms that does not. This is somewhat 
surprising, since we may expect capital constrained firms (typically firms that does not pay 
dividends) to hedge their margins. The coefficient for the hedging dummy is 0.1223 and the 
p-value is 0.059.  
Third, the debt ratio is negatively related to hedging levels.  This is may also be surprising, 
since leveraged firms may be more risky and hence be more interested in hedging this risk. 
The coefficient is -0.9411 and the p-value is 0.  
The last statistically significant variable is CAPEX/sales. With a coefficient of 0.6147 and a 
p-value of 0.069, we see that firms that invest much tend to hedge more. This may be because 
they want to hedge future investment opportunities.   
What we found surprising, were that jet fuel’s share of operating expenses did not show any 
significance at all as an explanatory variable. If jet fuel constitutes a large portion of expenses, 
and jet fuel prices are volatile, intuition says that the company would hedge.  
For the US sample, size and dividend dummy can explain hedging behavior, just like the 
European ones. The coefficients were 0.0243 and 0.1593 and the p-values 0.049 and 0.005 
respectively. In additions to these foreign currency and cash/sales shows statistically 
significant. Firms that hedge foreign currency, tends to hedge less jet fuel. The coefficient is -
0.1022 and the p-value is 0.060. The cash/sales variable has a coefficient of 0.4134 and a p-
value of 0.046.  
The combined sample yields much the same results. Size and dividends are positively related 
to hedging levels with coefficients of 0.0424 and 0.1565 and p-values of 0.001 and 0.001. 
Debt ratio has a coefficient of -0.3443 and a p-value of 0.001. In addition to these variables, 
Tobin’s Q shows a positive relation to hedging levels. The coefficient is 0.1272 and the p-
value is 0.001. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Available seat-kilometers for European airlines.  
Data is collected from each airline’s annual reports. 
Total ASK
2006 - 2008 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Air-France KLM 736,049 220,897 234,669 245,066 256,314
Lufthansa 511,259 126,400 119,877 124,026 140,647 144,182 146,720 169,108 195,431
British Airways 442,060 123,197 151,046 139,172 141,273 144,189 144,194 148,321 149,545
Iberia 198,767 58,467 55,405 56,145 61,058 63,628 65,796 66,454 66,517
Ryanair 157,106 7,142 9,784 14,069 22,520 28,640 39,099 51,488 66,519
SAS 153,752 38,120 54,235 54,800 60,173 62,445 63,555 44,433 45,764
Air Berlin 147,260 29,620 31,400 59,380 56,480
Easyjet 136,276 7,003 10,769 21,024 25,448 32,141 37,088 43,501 55,687
Austrian 83,074 20,518 19,561 24,800 29,218 30,887 31,374 26,600 25,100
Finnair 79,825 18,489 17,785 18,644 21,907 23,038 23,846 26,878 29,101
El Al Airways 59,930 18,665 20,325 19,752 20,104 20,074
Aer Lingus 59,259 13,786 15,440 17,226 19,633 22,400
Norwegian 24,505 248 1,149 2,301 3,464 5,371 7,560 11,574
Swiss 0 6,252 31,520 33,478 27,483
Year by year
Available Seat Kilometres (millions)
 
Table 2: American sample firms.  
Data is collected from each airline’s annual reports and websites. 
ASM 2008 Sample ASM Frequent
Classification Founded Alliance Destinations (mill.) market share flyer program Headquarter
Airtran Airways LCC 1992 None 62 23,809 2.4 % A+ Rewards Orlando, Florida
American Airlines (AMR Corp) Trad 1930 Oneworld 161 163,532 16.6 % Aadvantage Fort Worth, Texas
Continental Airlines Trad 1934 SkyTeam 292 115,511 11.7 % OnePass Houston, Texas
Delta Air Lines Trad 1924 SkyTeam 375 246,164 24.9 % SkyMiles Atlanta, Georgia
ExpressJet Airlines Trad 1986 None 151 12,606 1.3 % OnePass Houston, Texas
Frontier Airlines LCC 1994 None 59 N/A N/A EarlyReturns Denver, Colorado
Great Lakes Airlines Trad 1977 None 64 361 0.0 % None Cheyenne, Wyoming
Hawaiian Airlines Trad 1929 None 19 9,479 1.0 % HawaiianMiles Honolulu, Hawaii
Jet Blue Airways LCC 1999 None 58 32,442 3.3 % TrueBlue Forest Hills, NYC
Mesa Air Group Trad 1980 None 165 8,028 0.8 % None Phoenix, Arizona
Midwest Airlines Trad 1948 None 12 N/A N/A Midwest Miles Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Skywest Airlines Trad 1972 None 160 22,020 2.2 % Midwest Miles St. George, Utah
Southwest Airlines LCC 1971 None 65 103,271 10.5 % Rapid Rewards Dallas, Texas
United Airlines Trad 1927 Star Alliance 210 152025 15.4 % Mileage Plus Chicago, Illinois
US Airways Trad 1939 Star Alliance 231 74,151 7.5 % Dividend Miles Tempe, Arizona
987,208
Source: Company websites and annual reports
Sample firms characteristics (US airlines)
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 56 - 
 
Table 3: Jet fuel costs’ share of operating expenses for European airlines.  
Data is collected from each airline’s annual reports. 
Average
2006-2008 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
El Al Airways 37.5 % 26.0 % 31.0 % 33.0 % 36.0 % 43.4 %
Ryanair 36.7 % 17.0 % 22.5 % 22.3 % 20.8 % 26.3 % 34.5 % 39.3 % 36.4 %
Norwegian 32.3 % 10.3 % 16.2 % 20.8 % 25.5 % 29.7 % 31.2 % 35.9 %
Easyjet 28.8 % 17.1 % 13.2 % 16.1 % 16.3 % 23.0 % 26.0 % 26.7 % 33.7 %
Air Berlin 25.9 % 19.5 % 22.4 % 25.9 % 29.5 %
Iberia 24.9 % 13.7 % 12.4 % 12.5 % 14.0 % 18.0 % 22.5 % 22.1 % 30.1 %
British Airways 23.8 % 12.4 % 12.2 % 11.4 % 12.9 % 15.6 % 20.9 % 24.3 % 26.1 %
Aer Lingus 23.2 % 15.1 % 19.2 % 21.2 % 29.2 %
Finnair 21.4 % 11.6 % 10.1 % 9.7 % 12.0 % 16.8 % 20.1 % 20.0 % 24.2 %
Austrian 19.1 % 11.3 % 9.2 % 9.8 % 13.6 % 17.5 % 19.3 % 17.5 % 20.4 %
Air-France KLM 19.0 % 17.5 % 19.5 % 20.1 %
Lufthansa 18.1 % 8.8 % 7.7 % 7.6 % 10.2 % 14.2 % 16.2 % 17.1 % 21.0 %
SAS 17.8 % 10.0 % 8.5 % 8.3 % 11.2 % 14.0 % 18.0 % 17.0 % 18.5 %
Swiss N/A 11.6 % 14.6 % 15.0 %
Jet fuel costs as % of operating expenses
Year by year
 
Graph 1: Illustration of jet fuel costs’ share of operating expenses for European 
airlines in the years 2001-2008 
Illustration of the numbers in table 3 
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Table 4: Regression summary of European and US airlines’ stock price sensitivity 
to fuel price changes and stock market (index) returns.  
Stock and market data is collected from Yahoo! Finance while jet fuel prices are collected 
from Energy Information Administration.  
Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P Coef P
Average jet fuel coef All -0.1532 0.269 -0.0548 0.427 -0.1146 0.521 -0.0868 0.458 0.0024 0.614 0.0008 0.570 -0.1470 0.292 -0.1434 0.366 -0.4586 0.279 0.3534 0.469
Average jet fuel coef US -0.2156 0.182 0.0421 0.494 -0.0751 0.751 -0.1255 0.519 -0.0223 0.690 -0.0478 0.632 -0.2204 0.293 0.0314 0.418 -0.8594 0.066 0.5665 0.268
Average Jet fuel coef EUR -0.1220 0.313 -0.1517 0.360 -0.1443 0.348 -0.0697 0.431 0.0123 0.584 0.0203 0.544 -0.1164 0.292 -0.2308 0.339 -0.2581 0.385 0.2468 0.569
Median Jet fuel coef All -0.1324 0.175 -0.0847 0.334 -0.1255 0.525 -0.0807 0.378 -0.0089 0.602 -0.0122 0.583 -0.1927 0.274 -0.1683 0.316 -0.3544 0.171 0.3284 0.417
Median Jet fuel coef US -0.1335 0.096 0.0301 0.397 -0.0663 0.791 -0.0722 0.502 -0.0326 0.689 -0.0474 0.718 -0.2990 0.223 -0.0507 0.373 -1.0291 0.006 0.5497 0.201
Median Jet fuel coef EUR -0.1270 0.247 -0.1219 0.270 -0.1494 0.370 -0.0866 0.378 0.0293 0.584 -0.0017 0.532 -0.1673 0.303 -0.2089 0.316 -0.2448 0.288 0.1130 0.661
Jet fuel coef Low All -0.4686 0.001 -0.2658 0.137 -0.3323 0.128 -0.3036 0.011 -0.2435 0.178 -0.1076 0.034 -0.3678 0.011 -0.6650 0.000 -1.6416 0.001 -0.4313 0.072
Jet fuel coef Low US -0.4686 0.034 -0.1022 0.246 -0.1255 0.662 -0.3036 0.148 -0.0621 0.570 -0.0795 0.223 -0.3678 0.156 -0.3491 0.085 -1.6416 0.001 0.0910 0.072
Jet fuel coef Low EUR -0.4002 0.001 -0.2658 0.137 -0.3323 0.128 -0.2988 0.011 -0.2435 0.178 -0.1076 0.034 -0.3604 0.011 -0.6650 0.000 -0.6711 0.002 -0.4313 0.129
Jet fuel coef high All -0.0052 0.899 0.1984 0.838 0.0539 0.799 0.2033 0.988 0.1191 0.962 0.1857 0.998 0.3182 0.846 0.5195 0.971 0.1826 0.959 1.3421 0.980
Jet fuel coef high US -0.0147 0.623 0.1984 0.838 -0.0336 0.799 -0.0541 0.924 0.0380 0.812 -0.0169 0.870 0.0837 0.475 0.5195 0.971 0.1826 0.215 1.0739 0.646
Jet fuel coef high EUR -0.0052 0.899 -0.0673 0.674 0.0539 0.525 0.2033 0.988 0.1191 0.962 0.1857 0.998 0.3182 0.846 -0.0161 0.941 0.0399 0.959 1.3421 0.980
Average Index coef All 1.2536 0.003 1.5255 0.013 1.0887 0.022 2.1526 0.001 1.6735 0.032 1.0488 0.083 1.0742 0.092 1.1655 0.019 1.2045 0.011 1.1170 0.177
Average Index coef US 1.9208 0.000 2.2256 0.000 1.4810 0.001 3.3567 0.002 2.8037 0.000 1.4940 0.014 1.7455 0.068 1.4427 0.004 1.9785 0.000 2.3086 0.018
Average Index coef EUR 0.9200 0.005 0.8254 0.026 0.7945 0.038 1.6175 0.001 1.2215 0.045 0.8707 0.111 0.7945 0.102 1.0269 0.026 0.8175 0.016 0.5212 0.256
Median Index coef All 1.1197 0.000 1.4087 0.000 0.9346 0.000 1.6545 0.000 1.4033 0.001 1.0381 0.003 0.7172 0.004 1.2047 0.001 0.9067 0.000 1.0285 0.097
Median Index coef US 2.1534 0.000 2.2473 0.000 1.4970 0.000 2.8336 0.000 2.7369 0.000 1.7120 0.014 2.0624 0.004 1.4519 0.002 2.0780 0.000 2.5368 0.014
Median Index coef EUR 0.9843 0.000 0.4938 0.027 0.7181 0.019 1.6545 0.000 1.3587 0.014 0.9334 0.002 0.6694 0.004 1.1277 0.001 0.6860 0.001 0.8282 0.194
Index coef low All 0.3257 0.000 0.3698 0.000 0.1589 0.000 0.7050 0.000 0.3788 0.000 -0.3774 0.000 -0.1280 0.000 0.2989 0.000 0.3656 0.000 -1.3617 0.001
Index coef low US 0.9275 0.000 1.2047 0.000 0.9346 0.000 1.1597 0.000 1.5316 0.000 0.5918 0.004 0.6898 0.001 0.7534 0.000 0.8515 0.000 1.0742 0.001
Index coef low EUR 0.3257 0.000 0.3698 0.000 0.1589 0.000 0.7050 0.000 0.3788 0.000 -0.3774 0.000 -0.1280 0.000 0.2989 0.000 0.3656 0.000 -1.3617 0.016
Index coef high All 2.5937 0.058 3.2247 0.052 2.0114 0.114 6.6000 0.009 4.2093 0.213 1.9601 0.619 2.4996 0.932 2.2161 0.226 2.9604 0.115 3.1050 0.806
Index coef high US 2.5937 0.000 3.2247 0.000 2.0114 0.004 6.6000 0.009 4.2093 0.000 1.9601 0.025 2.4996 0.328 2.2161 0.014 2.9604 0.000 3.1050 0.039
Index coef high EUR 1.3725 0.058 1.6127 0.052 1.5831 0.114 2.6724 0.004 1.6474 0.213 1.7682 0.619 1.9906 0.932 1.6315 0.226 1.6419 0.115 1.2861 0.806
2001 - 2009 2001
Regression results: Stock Price vs. Jet fuel and market 
2008 20092002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Graph 2:  Illustration of the average sensitivity of airline stock returns to jet fuel 
price changes.  
-1.0000
-0.8000
-0.6000
-0.4000
-0.2000
0.0000
0.2000
0.4000
0.6000
0.8000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t
Average regression coefficient; Stock returns vs Jet fuel 
price changes
Average All Airlines
Average US Airlines
Average European Airlines
 
 
 
- 58 - 
 
Graph 3:  Illustration of the median sensitivity of airline stock returns to jet fuel 
price changes.  
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Table 5: Correlations between the changes in prices of oil and oil refined 
products from 1986-2009. 
Data is collected from Energy Information Administration. 
Cushing, OK 
WTI Spot 
 Europe 
Brent Spot 
New York Harbor 
No. 2 Heating Oil 
U.S. Gulf 
Coast No. 2 
Heating Oil 
New York 
Harbor 
Kerosene-
Type Jet Fuel
 U.S. Gulf 
Coast 
Kerosene-
Type Jet Fuel 
 Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-
Antwerp (ARA) 
Kerosene-Type 
Jet Fuel 
 Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) 
Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel 0.6935 0.7404 0.7408 0.7944 0.7575 0.7566 1
 U.S. Gulf Coast Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel 0.6887 0.7128 0.8215 0.9285 0.8802 1
New York Harbor Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel 0.6717 0.6975 0.9121 0.8808 1
U.S. Gulf Coast No. 2 Heating Oil 0.7423 0.7652 0.8965 1
New York Harbor No. 2 Heating Oil 0.6865 0.7115 1
 Europe Brent Spot 0.8262 1
Cushing, OK WTI Spot 1
Correlations
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Table 6: Summary of hedging behavior for European airlines in the period 2001-
2008 at fical year end.  
A indicator is set to 1 if the companies have used certain types of instruments. The lists shows 
average values. The maximum maturity of any hedges is also included and the table shows 
each company’s average.  
Years Average % Use of Use of Maturity Use of IR Use of FX Missing 
Observed of next year's swaps/ options/ of hedge derivatives derivatives observations
fuel hedged forwards collars
Aer Lingus 2001-2008 56% 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.00 1.00 None
Air Berlin 2006-2008 55% 1.00 1.00 1.67 1.00 1.00 2001-2006
Air France-KLM 2006-2008 78% 1.00 1.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 2001-2007
Austrian 2003-2008 13% 0.50 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 2001-2002
British Airways 2002-2008 37% 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 2001
easyJet 2001-2008 45% 0.88 0.75 1.88 0.38 0.88 None
El Al 2004-2008 46% 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2001-2003
Finnair 2001-2008 51% 1.00 1.00 2.13 1.00 1.00 None
Iberia 2002-2008 52% 0.71 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 2001.00
Lufthansa 2001-2008 70% 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 None
Norwegian 2003-2008 5% 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.17 1.00 2001-2002
Ryanair 2001-2008 50% 0.83 0.00 1.17 1.00 1.00 None
SAS 2001-2009 43% 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 None
Swiss 2002-2005 50% 1.00 1.00 2.50 0.50 1.00 2001, 2006-2008
Hedging behaviour by airline
  
Table 7:  Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value.  
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. In model 1 the percentage of next year’s fuel requirements 
hedged is included, while a dummy variable indicating fuel hedging is used in model 2. The 
dummy equals 1 if the company has hedged more than 0 %, 0 otherwise.  
Constant 2.5108 2.3900 -0.0350 -0.0911 1.0251 0.9737
0.0000 0.0000 0.8760 0.6750 0.0000 0.0000
% hedged 0.4446 0.4127 1.0251
0.0270 ** 0.0720 0.0500 **
Hedging dummy -0.0182 0.2994 0.0783
0.8980 0.0040 *** 0.3320
ln (total assets) -0.2355 -0.1785 -0.0346 -0.0443 -0.1305 0.0783
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.1950 0.0920 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Dividend dummy -0.2420 -0.1985 -0.0279 0.0865 0.1312 0.1799
0.0160 ** 0.0500 ** 0.8090 0.4350 0.1520 0.0480 **
Debt/Assets 0.1292 -0.3523 1.1912 1.2187 1.0285 0.9660
0.7580 0.3810 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
ROA 2.2006 1.9123 0.0809 0.0867 0.1696 0.1704
0.0280 ** 0.0600 * 0.2810 0.2350 0.0580 * 0.0590 *
CAPEX/Sales 0.1567 0.4739 0.2725 0.2518 0.1529 0.1592
0.7700 0.4080 0.2550 0.2800 0.5510 0.5420
Operating cash flow/sales 2.2777 2.5305 -0.2526 -0.0806 1.1470 1.2794
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.6780 0.8920 0.0230 ** 0.0120 **
EBIT/Interest expenses 0.0000 0.0002 0.0344 0.0390 0.0020 0.0023
0.9980 0.9190 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.2960 0.2340
FX hedging dummy -0.2728 -0.3519 -0.0611 0.0081 0.1029 0.1266
0.4230 0.3190 0.5950 0.9440 0.1920 0.1010
Cash / Sales 0.2678 0.2673 1.8064 1.8111 1.0290 1.0627
0.3650 0.3800 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
ln (value of executive shares) 0.0171 0.0126 0.0750 0.0584 0.0380 0.0357
0.3480 0.5010 0.0030 *** 0.0230 ** 0.0180 ** 0.0270 **
Pass through agreement 0.4576 0.5070
(US firms only) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2Model 1Model 2Model 1
Europe US All
Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value
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Table 8: Summary of Tobin’s Q for European airlines 
Years Average Skipped
Observed Tobin's Q observations
Aer Lingus 2001-2008 0.99 None
Air Berlin 2006-2008 0.65 2001-2006
Air France-KLM 2006-2008 0.54 2001-2007
Austrian 2003-2008 0.41 2001-2002
British Airways 2002-2008 0.62 2001
easyJet 2001-2008 1.23 None
El Al 2004-2008 0.47 2001-2003
Finnair 2001-2008 0.58 None
Iberia 2002-2008 0.73 2001.00
Lufthansa 2001-2008 0.56 None
Norwegian 2003-2008 1.37 2001-2002
Ryanair 2001-2008 2.29 None
SAS 2001-2009 0.52 None
Swiss 2002-2005 0.29 2001, 2006-2008
Average Tobin's Q for European airlines
 
Table 9: Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value (2001-2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 3.3468 2.9031 -0.1547 -0.2134 1.0013 0.9258
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.5950 0.4450 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
% hedged of fuel requirements 0.7801 0.4905 0.4018
0.0060 *** 0.1210 0.0430 **
Hedging dummy 0.1920 0.3988 0.1380
0.2780 0.0050 *** 0.1620
ln (total assets) -0.3366 -0.2467 -0.0204 -0.0318 -0.1382 -0.1296
0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.5560 0.3430 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Dividend dummy -0.3120 -0.2679 -0.0713 0.0735 0.1379 0.1996
0.0110 ** 0.0410 ** 0.6660 0.6110 0.2520 0.0930 *
Debt/Assets 0.9668 0.0382 1.2190 1.2150 1.2135 1.1512
0.0990 * 0.9440 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
ROA 2.0470 1.1800 0.0794 0.0944 0.1621 0.1687
0.1180 0.4100 0.3620 0.2590 0.1090 0.0990 *
CAPEX/Sales 0.2725 0.5717 0.1992 0.1730 0.0141 -0.0024
0.6650 0.4090 0.5140 0.5540 0.9640 0.9940
Operating cash flow/sales 3.0160 3.5109 0.1015 0.1529 1.6111 1.7874
0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.9180 0.8700 0.0270 ** 0.0150 **
EBIT/Interest expenses 0.0009 0.0016 0.0360 0.0436 0.0013 0.0017
0.6830 0.5160 0.0080 *** 0.0010 *** 0.5360 0.0150 **
FX hedging dummy -0.5483 -0.5724 -0.0516 0.0798 0.1162 0.1390
0.1250 0.1440 0.7470 0.6230 0.2640 0.1730
Cash/Sales -0.3851 -0.2931 1.7673 1.7751 0.9004 0.9471
0.3090 0.4710 0.0010 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***
ln (value of executive shares) 0.0703 0.0525 0.0721 0.0503 0.0449 0.0431
0.0009 *** 0.0590 * 0.0250 ** 0.1130 0.0310 ** 0.0390 **
Pass through agreement 0.4471 0.5098
(US firms only) 0.0260 ** 0.0050 ***
Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value (2001 - 2006)  
Europe US All
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Table 10: Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value (2007-2008) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 1.8748 1.7857 0.3905 0.4245 1.2021 1.1276
0.0030 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0410 ** 0.0160 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
% hedged of fuel requirements 0.2115 0.0563 -0.0890
0.4520 0.7590 0.6630
Hedging dummy -0.6067 0.1471 -0.2345
0.2030 0.0880 * 0.0760 *
ln (total assets) -0.1854 -0.0970 -0.0521 -0.0678 -0.1079 -0.0730
0.0220 ** 0.2790 0.0080 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0550 *
Dividend dummy -0.1984 -0.1877 0.2028 0.2037 0.0706 -0.0043
0.3360 0.3250 0.0310 ** 0.0170 ** 0.5210 0.9680
Debt/Assets 0.5192 0.3562 1.0133 1.0133 0.2379 0.1125
0.4680 0.5960 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.4580 0.7170
ROA 4.0430 3.3100 0.5020 0.4016 0.5250 0.6329
0.0230 ** 0.0480 ** 0.0960 * 0.0870 * 0.3060 0.2010
CAPEX/Sales -1.0760 -0.1720 -0.1702 0.0224 0.0667 0.2441
0.3070 0.8870 0.5980 0.9400 0.9080 0.6640
Operating cash flow/sales 2.0020 1.8320 -0.4460 -0.4784 0.0793 -0.1003
0.0800 * 0.0970 * 0.2140 0.1040 0.8910 0.8560
EBIT/Interest expenses 0.0070 0.0003 0.0077 0.0190 0.0168 0.0143
0.4380 0.9760 0.5200 0.1340 0.0280 ** 0.0540 *
FX hedging dummy 0.0189 0.0419 0.1371 0.1382
0.7310 0.4020 0.1520 0.1120
Cash/Sales 2.0020 0.8745 0.9608 0.6886 1.0181 1.0519
0.0800 * 0.1810 0.0260 ** 0.0820 * 0.0180 0.0110
ln (value of executive shares) -0.1480 -0.0346 0.0536 0.0440 0.0342 0.0362
0.6530 0.3280 0.0080 *** 0.0170 ** 0.1130 0.0800 *
Pass through agreement 0.2198 0.3029
(US firms only) 0.0250 ** 0.0040 ***
Regression summary: Jet fuel hedging and firm value (2007 - 2008)  
Europe US All
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Graph 4: Illustration of size vs. hedging level 
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Graph 5: Illustration of debt ratio vs. hedging level 
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Graph 6: Illustration of investment level vs. hedging level 
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Table 11: Regression summary: Determinants of jet fuel hedging behavior.  
The percentage of next year’s fuel requirements is used as dependent variable.  
Constant -0.4658 -0.0458 -0.0164
0.1850 0.6870 0.8750
Q 0.1666 0.0923 0.1272
0.1666 0.0610 0.0010 ***
ln (total assets) 0.1341 0.0243 0.0424
0.0000 *** 0.0490 ** 0.0010 ***
Dividend dummy 0.1223 0.1593 0.1565
0.0590 * 0.0050 *** 0.0010 ***
Debt/Assets -0.9411 -0.1843 -0.3443
0.0000 *** 0.1410 0.0010 ***
ROA -0.7587 -0.0090 -0.0221
0.2510 0.7970 0.5940
CAPEX/Sales 0.6147 -0.0271 0.0907
0.0690 * 0.8100 0.4440
Operating cash flow/sales -0.5475 -0.0065 0.1546
0.2470 0.9820 0.5130
EBIT/Interest expenses 0.0006 -0.0009 0.1546
0.6170 0.8320 0.5130
FX hedging dummy -0.2323 -0.1022 0.0242
0.3240 0.0600 * 0.5460
Cash / Sales -0.0619 0.4134 -0.0070
0.7430 0.0460 ** 0.9480
ln (value of executive shares) 0.0005 0.0189 -0.0110
0.9700 0.1180 0.1600
Fuel % of operating expenses -0.1585 -0.0711 -0.2457
0.6510 0.7160 0.1940
IR hedging dummy 0.1209 -0.0488 0.0197
0.1890 0.1950 0.6040
Pass through agreement -0.2507 -0.3027
(US firms only) 0.0000 0.0000
Regression summary: Determinants of jet fuel hedging levels
AllUSEurope
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Graph 7: Illustration of investments and jet fuel costs 
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